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Technological progress and economic growth are deep related. It is primarily through technological 
improvements that humankind has been able to progress to the extent it has since the First Industrial 
Revolution. Technological advances have displaced existing economic structures and laid down 
fundaments for new economic forces and opportunities, all of which had a widespread welfare effect. 
Growth theory indeed assumes that changes in real output and productivity are result of technological 
shocks within the economy. By focusing on computer and information techonology, using ARIMA 
models and Beveridge-Nelson univariate decomposition this paper estimates the impact of 
technological shocks on GDP, GDP per capita and labour productivity growth of three world’s strongest 
economies: USA, Japan and Germany. The paper confirms the thesis that information technology has 
been the key factor of improved productivity and growth performance of these economies. 
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Historical pattern of technological progress strongly suggests that innovations that sprouted 
from technological developments, which are independent of society initiatives, have been an 
indispensable part of economic growth of developed countries. These technological 
improvements displaced existing economic structures and laid down fundaments for new 
economic forces and opportunities, all of which had a widespread welfare effect. 
Innovations have long been recognized as one of the key elements of economic 
development, though some scholars believe that its direct link to the concept of economic 
growth is rather controversial. Economic historians have stressed the role of technological 
innovations (together with other important factors such as institutional, political and 
economic climate, education, lower population growth, as well as efficient investment 
policy) as an underlying determinant of the process that designs economic growth path 
(Dosi, Freeman and Fabiani, 1994). Dichotomy between technological changes and 
technology adoption also explains the persistent productivity difference across countries and 
time (Gancia and Zilibott, 2009). Developed countries have recognized technology as the 
dominant factor influencing productivity growth, which enabled them to adequately 
generate and diffuse new knowledge into productive structures (helping the economic 
actors on other social levels in much broader sense). As a result, macro and microeconomic 
coordination, greater productivity and greater consumption were achieved in modern 
developed societies. In some developed countries, the impact of technological progress on 
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economic growth has been estimated at 60-70% as compared with other growth factors. 
Growth theory indeed assumes that changes in real output are result of technological shocks 
within the economy. These shocks embodied in technological innovations have permanent 
effect on real output and productivity growth, raising the standard of living over the time as 
the economy moves to an improved equilibrium point (Falatoon and Safarzadeh, 2006).   
 
For the number of years economists were sceptical about effects of computer and 
information technology on aggregate productivity and economic growth, however new 
studies have shown that the surge of productivity (especially in the USA in the 1990s) has 
been largely the result of the adoption of new technologies (Edwards, 2001). The computer 
equipment manufacturing industry comprised only 0,30% of USA’s value added in the period 
1960-2007, but has generated 2,70% of economic growth and 25,0% of productivity growth 
(Jorgenson, Ho and Samuels, 2010). Since the 1960s and 1970s slogan ‘Made in Japan’ has 
been a synonym for high quality and high technology for consumers all around the globe, 
especially in the field of electronics (Fan and Watanabe, 2006). Germany’s tryouts in high 
technology are as instructive as any lessons learned from that constitute the more closely 
studied success stories, from Silicon Valley and Route 128 to Japan, Taiwan and South Korea 
(Siebert and Stolpe, 2001). The so-called ‘New Economy’ associated with advances in 
computer, information and communication technology is often related to transformation of 
economies from industrial to information societies. Good examples include government 
promotion and regulation of technology development and information industries, 
information infrastructure, as well as prevailing development of information based talent 
and cultures. However, some state that the advances made by using these new industries 
are far from the benefits associated with the two industrial revolutions. Up until the end of 
the 1980s economists had trouble to distinguish actual benefits from such technologies. The 
potential of computer, information and communication prospect, however, was made clear 
in the 1990s. (Šimurina and Tolić, 2008). 
 
This paper analyzes the impact of major technological innovations within the ‘Third 
Industrial Revolution technologies (i.e. computer and information technology) on the real 
GDP, GDPpc and labour productivity growth of three developed countries (USA, Japan and 
Germany) by using the data for the years 1950-2013. Data are collected from the Conference 
Board Total Economy Database. The results are an indispensible part of a much larger study 
conducted by the author thus represents an analytical extent (comparison, reasoning, 
deliberation, etc.) on the conclusions drawn from Tomić (2012) and Škare and Tomić (2014). 
 
 
2. Theoretical background and main empirical facts 
 
Technological change is composed of many socio-economic relationships and therefore it is 
inevitably tied up with historical factors. The objective of this paper is not only to measure 
the implications of technological innovations on mankind well-being, but to observe and 
analyze them in a form that will provide distinctive international comparison. While on one 
hand we have to recognise the fact that though, generally speaking, technological progress 
increases productivity gains and welfare of people, it is, however, not an easy task to 
quantify and assess a precise contribution of technological progress; on the other hand, the 
non-rivalry of technology, as modelled in most of endogenous growth literature, implies that 
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higher population growth spurs technological change (Kremer, 1993). Thus, technological 
progress must be observed within economic (output and productivity growth) and social 
(population growth) domain. 
 
The main question that dwells upon the economists is whether economic growth can be 
sustained in the long run. If it can then: what determines the long-run growth-rate; in what 
socio-economic environment can it be fostered; and which economic policy can be used to 
accelerate it. Naturally, macroeconomic management faces difficult question as to how best 
to promote rapid and sustainable economic growth in face of depleting non-renewable 
natural resources. As many scholars point out, advances in technology are the best chance 
mankind has to overcome the apparent limits to growth. By citing Schumpeter (1934), 
Sollow (1970), Romer (1990), Aghion and Howit (1992) and many others, Grossman and 
Helpman (1993) concluded that improvements in technology have been the real force 
behind perpetually rising standards of living. Technology has been widely identified as 
contributor to economic growth beginning from the empirical study by Denison in 1967, 
showing that it has been responsible for over 40% of economic growth in the USA and the 
UK. Simon Kuznets work (1966) too identifies the significance of technological change i.e. 
that productivity and economic growth are broadly assigned to technology development 
(Cypher and Dietz, 2004). Following the Neo-Classical growth models and pioneering work of 
Robert Solow (1956; 1957) we could conclude that technological change, is indeed expressed 
in relatively large ‘residual factor’ (Dosi, Freeman and Fabiani, 1994). But until recently, little 
progress was made in the formal modelling of technical change itself. As Gancia and Zilibott 
(2009) point out, despite the obvious importance of technology in explaining modern 
growth, quantifying the exact contribution of technical progress is not really easy, 
considering that technological progress is hard to observe and measure directly. New-
Growth theory (Romer; 1986; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992) does 
attempt to incorporate some measures of technological innovation, however it also provides 
some limitations on the ways the technology is represented (Dosi, Freeman and Fabiani, 
1994). Furthermore, since innovative activity and technological progress have a positive 
effect on productivity growth, it means that Schumpeterian growth hypothesis which 
predicts that productivity growth is driven by the levels of research intensity in the economy, 
in fact holds (Rajabrata, 2011). Following endogenous technological approach some second-
generation Schumpeterian growth models were developed (Aghion and Howitt, 1998; 
Howitt, 1999; Peretto and Smulders, 2002; Ha and Howitt, 2007).  
 
Advancement in computer and information (plus communication) technology, often referred 
as ICT sector, is regularly labelled as ‘Third Industrial Revolution’. Though there is no 
compelling evidence that these technological improvements constitute the next industrial 
revolution, its full potential is being revealed and materialised in the lower prices of 
information technology, reduction in the cost of capital, rapid productivity growth and 
significant improvement in organisational techniques. From new innovations like software, 
robotics, biotechnology and nanotechnology to improvements in manufacturing systems, 
technology has made economies and more efficient and productive (Škare and Tomić, 2014). 
Computer and information technology has been an important element of growth dynamics 
of the most of the developed countries in last few decades. Furthermore, computer derived 
technology became an important element in explaining cross-country income differences. 
Considering that technological progress is the fundamental force underlying long-run GDP 
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growth, we can conclude that it can also explain why some countries have been so much 
more productive than the others (Tomić, 2012). For example, Cypher and Dietz (2004) by 
following various studies concluded that the level of technological capability of information 
technology was positively correlated with the pace of economic expansion of OECD 
countries over the period 1965-1990. The share of GDP devoted to the research and 
development in the private sector in less developed countries lags far behind what is spent 
in the OECD developed economies, suggesting that there remains a gap in technological 
effort and capability between even the highest tier less developed economies and the 
developed countries. In following pages we conclude that focus on technological 
entrepreneurship enabled USA to pioneer new technical advances. USA’s approach 
comprised new and tight industrial networks of small and larger firms, research universities, 
venture capital etc. that concentrated around high-tech districts like Silicon Valley in 
California and Route 128 around Boston (Florida and Kenney, 1990). Most research suggests 
that levels of information technology investments by companies did contribute substantially 
to the increased labour productivity growth in Japan. Jorgenson and Motohashi (2003) point 
out that the contribution of information technology to economic growth was strikingly 
similar in the USA and Japan in the second half of 1990s. Several empirical studies have 
suggested that the research productivity of the German innovation system is much higher in 
comparison with most European countries (Siebert and Stolpe, 2001). Again, we have to 
acknowledge that USA and Japan have been exchanging on the first and second place of the 
annual list of countries with most inventions for a long time, with Germany being always in 
the top behind these two economic giants. 
 
 
3. Methodology and data 
 
In order to test effects of technological progress on growth and productivity of selected 
countries we have applied methodology used by Falatoon and Safarzadeh (2006). Similar 
methodology was used by Škare and Tomić (2014). Their approach is based on Neo-Classical 
growth models of Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) who assume that real GDP per unit of 
labour is a function of capital per unit of labour and technology: 
 
  Y/N = f (A, K/N)            (1) 
 
where Y is real GDP, N is labour unit, K is capital input and A is technological improvement. 
Since growth theory assumes that in equilibrium real GDP of unit of labour grows at the rate 
of technological growth, it means that with technological innovation of A, at the so-called 
steady-state, real GDP will grow at the rate of innovation growth (Á). If we consider 
technological innovations as supply shocks which have a permanent effect on the trend of 
GDP, a decomposition of such variable on its permanent and irregular components could 
reveal impact of technological improvement on the growth rate of real GDP between two 
‘path breaking’ innovations. As to ensure appropriate decomposition of the deviations of the 
real GDP growth from its long-run growth into its deviations due to demand shocks and 
technological improvement within time, Falatoon and Safarzadeh based their modelling on 
the equation:  
 
  Ýt = Át + Ńt                        (2) 
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such that the trait represents the rate of change of the respective variable. If Ý* and Ń* 
represent potential values, equation (2) can be reformulated to interpret both, deviation of 
real GDP growth from its long run and growth rate of potential real GDP per unit of growth 
for effective labour so we get: 
 
  (Ýt
* - Ýt) = α [Ýt
* - (Át + Ńt
*)]           (3) 
  (Ńt
* - Ńt) = (1 – α) [Ýt
* - (Át + Ńt
*)]          (4) 
 
Equations (1) and (2) should be interpreted as follows; an increase in the growth rate of 
technological improvement depending on the value of α will accelerate the rate of real GDP 
while positively impacting on the rate of growth of real output; but with the time passing by, 
the excess output gap will become smaller so the effect of the technology shock will 
eventually fade away, pushing the rate of growth to its long-rung potential (Falatoon and 
Safarzadeh, 2006). 
 
In order to evaluate the permanent trend in the growth and productivity variables we have 
to extract conditional expectation of the limiting value of the forecast function derived from 
ARIMA models, similar to the above mentioned authors. An ARIMA model is appropriate for 
this kind of analysis since it predicts a value in a response time series as a linear combination 
of its own past values, past errors (shock or innovations) and current and past values of 
other time series. Besides, ARIMA procedure provides a comprehensive set of tools for 
univariate time series model identification, parameter estimation and forecasting, and in 
that way it offers great flexibility. To identify appropriate ARIMA models we have to 
recognize its elements p, d and q. Lags of the differenced series in the forecasting equation 
are called auto-regressive terms (p), lags of the forecast errors are called moving average 
terms (q), and a time series which needs to be differenced to be made stationary is said to 
be an integrated version (d) of a stationary series. Based on those elements we can estimate 
proper ARIMA model. In the literature on trend/cycle decomposition, Beveridge and Nelson 
(BN) approach was recognized as a model based method for decomposing a univariate or 
multivariate time series into permanent and transitory components. Beveridge and Nelson 
(1981) showed how to decompose ARIMA (p,1,q) i.e. proposed a definition of the permanent 
component of an I(1) time series yt with drift μ as the limiting forecast as horizon goes to 
infinity, adjusted for the mean rate of growth over the forecast horizon, 
 
TDt + BNt = lim yt+h|t - δh                            (5) 
          h→∞ 
 
where TDt represents deterministic trend. The stochastic part of permanent component (7), 
BNt is referred as the BN trend. The implied cycle (C) at the time t is then  
 
Ct = yt − TDt − BNt             (6) 
 
so Beveridge and Nelson suggested that if ∆yt has Wold representation Δyt = δ + ψ
*(L)εt then 
BNt follows a pure random walk without drift (Zivot, 2005, pp. 5): 
 
BNt = BNt−1 + ψ
*(1)εt            (7) 
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To conclude, the long-horizon conditional forecast used to calculate the BN trend 
corresponds to an estimate of the permanent component of an integrated time series. This 
forecast will be different at each period as additional information becomes available. 
 
Data on growth and productivity variables (real GDP, real GDPpc, real labour productivity 
(LP) per person and per hour) for mentioned countries has been collected from the 
Conference Board Total Economy Database for the period 1950-2013. Variables are 
converted to 2013 price level with 2005 EKS PPPs in order to obtain real category. Data span 
is chosen based on the assumption that commercial usage of computer and subsequent 
technologies started immediately after the II World War. Likewise Falatoon and Safarzadeh 
(2006), we also divided the sample periods into sub-periods based on the major 
technological improvements in computer and subsequent industries over the last 60 years, 
with classification being selected by the rule-of-thumb. In order to evaluate trend 
perspective, we estimated growth rates for all the variables and for all sub-periods. To 
estimate adequate ARIMA models we performed logarithmic transformation on the 
variables and tested the presence of a unit root. For this purpose we used Augmented 
Dickey Fuller test (1979), Phillips-Perron test (1988) and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin 
test (1992). Generally (though with some exceptions), all tests confirmed the presence of 
unit root for all the variables and for all the countries in a whole and in its sub-periods. 
Graphical displays of the observed variables also suggest that they are not stationary in 
levels. In conclusion, variables reveal a non-stationary behaviour. This means that we have 
to apply appropriate degree of integration before we run ARIMA models. 
 
Now that we know all the characteristics of our variables, we can estimate ARIMA models 
for all the countries. Due to several facts (small sample, loss of degrees of freedom, similar 
results in whole period and when divided in sub-periods), ARIMA models were estimated for 
a whole period and then divided into its sub-periods (as growth rates). The model selection 
was based on Schwartz Bayesian Criterion being the most restrictive one. For each model we 
checked for serial correlation in residuals. ARCH tests indicated no problem of 
autocorrelation and there were no problems of normality in residuals. Since all the variables 
had to be differenced in order to obtain stationarity and we wanted to gain some flexibility 
in moving average terms so we can filter out the noise and more accurately estimate local 
mean, ARIMA (1,1,1) models were estimated for all the countries1. The permanent trend in 
the variable (as a measure of economic prosperity impact of technological progress) was 
presented as the conditional expectation of the limiting value of the forecast function 
derived from the obtained ARIMA models. For each sub-period growth rates were calculated 
so that the economic prosperity impact of innovation could be measured as a geometric 
mean2 of the permanent trend component of the decomposed series for that sub-period. 




                                                          
1
 Except for the USA when assessing the lnGDP: ARIMA (1,1,2) and lnGDPpc: ARIMA (2,1,1). 
2
 Geometric mean is an important tool for calculating portfolio performance for many reasons, but one of the 
most significant is it takes into account the effects of compounding. 
3
 For detailed insight into data analysis, tests and results please contact the author.  
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4. Economic growth and the ICT 
 
Since the adaptation of new technologies, ICT is being credited for relatively strong 
acceleration in productivity and output growth in the USA, Japan and Germany. Producers 
and users of computers, semiconductors and other ICT equipment have been making 
sizeable efficiency gains, boosting aggregate total factor productivity growth. That has 
happened in the period when many other developed industrial economies have not 
experienced a pickup in productivity growth (Gust and Marquez, 2002). Namely the delay in 
the adaptation of new high-tech principles in those countries was translated into slower 
output and productivity growth in comparison to these three economic pillars. During the 
observed period, inclined by the commercial usage of computer and subsequent industries, 
average GDP growth was well over 3% and average GDPpc growth above 2%. After the II 
World War, Japan had an incredible growth path (in average GDP growth 4,80%, GDPpc 
growth 4,06%) whereat Computer and information related industries contributed the most 
to the positive co-movements of other economic indicators (aggregate income effect, 
investment, research and development, employment etc.). Therefore, Japan had benefited 
the most from these industries. Interestingly, Computer and subsequent industries had a 
stronger long-term impact effect on the European economies, than on the US economy. We 
also evaluated the effects of the increase in labour productivity over the observed period 
(which was followed by the fall in hours engaged in the production process). Labour 
productivity increase per person and per hour was ranging from 1,68% to 1,87% in the USA, 
from 3,80% to 4,11% in Japan and from 2,61% to 3,54% in Germany. However, we must not 
ignore the fact that there has been a slowdown in growth and productivity since 1970s due 
to a decrease in the rate of technological development. Labour productivity per hour and per 
person (as well as total employment) grew, however hours employed in production fell 
substantially which also contributed to that fact. This is especially noticeable in Japan and 
Germany where both real output and productivity growth was falling over the years. The 
proximate reason for the decline in the rate of technological development can be found in a 
decline in fertility of R&D and limited reach of technological improvements in the service 
sector (Blanchard, 2003). This statement is not so much true for the US that relied on the 
role of regulatory practices in influencing the diffusion of ICT. As Gust and Marquez (2002) 
noticed, European countries and Japan have participated in recent wave of invention and 
innovation thus having full access to the newer technologies. However, they have arguably 
been slower in applying them due to relatively inflexible and more costly labour markets. 
The decline of growth rates can be seen in Figure 1, pointing slowdown in labour 
productivity in Japan, relative deceleration of output and productivity growth rates in 
Germany and stable dynamics in the USA. Non-the-less, ICT sector proved to be an 
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Figure 1. Real output and productivity growth due to technological progress  
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Results suggest that the technological progress in main innovation industries was the highest 
contributing part of the long-run growth of GDP and GDPpc, as well of labour productivity in 
the observed period. The industry that gave the highest relative contribution to the average 
output growth in the 20th century was the Computer industry with an average GDP growth 
rate of 3,51%, average GDPpc growth of 2,09,%, LP per person growth of 2,15% and LP per 
hour of 2,45% for the USA (estimated by technological improvements), meaning that 
technological progress of that industry was in fact entirely integrated in improved standard 
of living. This was even more so true for Germany (average GDP growth rate of 5,62%, 
average GDPpc growth of 4,99,%, LP per person growth of 4,52% and LP per hour of 5,55%) 
and especially Japan (average GDP growth rate of 8,62%, average GDPpc growth of 7,54,%, 
LP per person growth of 6,95% and LP per hour of 6,64%). Subsequent industries, closely 
related to the Computer Industry, likewise showed significant influence. Together, their 
average and cumulative impact effect on the GDP growth within technological domain was 
3,06% and 9,16% for USA, 4,50% and 13,49% for Japan, and 3,08% and 9,24% for Germany. 
Interestingly, we find weak correlation between GDP and productivity growth rates among 
these countries over the time and variables, meaning that the growth paths were piebald 
(see Table 3).  
 
The contribution of new technologies to GDP and productivity growth in Japan conspicuously 
increased up until the 1980s, but then dramatically decreased in the 1990s. Though it played 
essential role in sustaining growth, in the 1990s technological progress made a marginal 
contribution to the economy (Fan and Watanabe, 2006), as Japan entered its post-bubble 
and economic recession period as its growth rate dropped to around 1% in the period 1990-
2013. Despite that fact, Japan’s success in exporting high-tech products has been impressive. 
There are few basic reasons why Japan was so powerful in ICT development: (1) patent 
system was designed to promote technological catch-up and diffusion through incremental 
innovation, (2) large companies are active in multiple high-tech industries, (3) close internal 
linkages between innovation and manufacturing i.e. strong technological synergy and (4) 
important role of government in promoting technological capability and capacity. Many 
scholars have attributed the strong economic performance of the USA in the 1900s and 
2000s to intense productivity growth. Most of studies support the view that the productivity 
gains after 1990 were linked to ICT developments, although this effect was somewhat 
weaker than in earlier period when GDP and productivity growth was much higher. 
Established climate of entrepreneurship plus development of technological and managerial 
talent, networks of new small and some old larger firms as well as research facilities enabled 
works, firms and business complexes to respond quickly to ever changing market conditions 
which generated a constant flow of innovations putting USA in such manner in the centre of 
technological advances that provided stable output and productivity growth over time. 
Germany on the other hand remained content with maintaining comparative advantages in 
its traditional industries - engineering based in the after war period with growth rates 
exceeding 5%, both in real GDP and labour productivity. As new development opportunities 
concentrated around high-tech sectors, Germany as a country endowed with capital and 
skilled labour force (scientists, researchers, engineers, etc.) needed to focus on the new 
scope: diffusion of ICT knowledge and equipment from public sector to private industry and 
back. As Lehrer (2000) pointed, reorientation of the German economy towards high-tech has 
come to be widely regarded as a condition sine qua non for prosperity, economic growth and 
even the preservation of its traditional industries. The results showed up quickly in the 
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patent statistics, favourable conditions for high-tech entrepreneurship which was 
harmonized with competitiveness in the traditional industries and followed with reallocation 
of major resources from old industries to new ones and so on. Furthermore, Siebert and 
Stolpe (2001) argue that not only German, but European income elasticity as well, in relation 
to employment of additional R&D scientists and engineers is high, if employed in Germany, 
because the technological innovation in Germany tends to create the maximum knowledge 
spill-over effect for other European economies. Indeed, Germany has fully participated in 
the upsurge of patenting since the mid-1990s. We can conclude that technological progress 
by all main contributing (computer and subsequent) industries assured permanent welfare 
effect that generated political, social and economic power of the USA, Japan and Germany 
worldwide. These countries developed certain line of technological advancement by 
investing in complementary inputs such as knowledge, science and research that contributed 
over the time to each country’s specific capability to effectively facilitate growth. Thus we 
agree with Cypher and Dietz (2004) in their conclusion that precisely these areas of social 
investment that can spell the difference between successful and failed development and are 
the necessary precondition for future economic prosperity. 
 
 
5. Beyond conclusion 
 
The significance of technological improvement to economic growth and development has 
been empirically verified over and over again. Each theoretical model, even the neoclassical 
growth model, has confirmed that basic factor of production cannot explain all of economic 
growth and that the ‘residual’ which often constitutes technology is the factor that can 
explain the differing development paths of nations. Technological advancement reduces 
costs and increase productive efficiency and thus rejects the Malthusian thesis of deprivation 
and hunger. Therein, we have showed that technological progress in the observed period 
was in fact entirely incorporated in the improved living standard of selected countries, 
thereby having enormous welfare effect which conceptually has designed subsequent 
growth. But technological change was a historically ephemeral event which went through 
the phase of discovery, implementation and obsolescence. Having that in mind, we can be 
sure that a new maiden technology will soon arise as a part of new post-modern period of 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. Agregate results 
 
USA Industry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1950 - 1972 Computer 3,86 2,35 2,30 2,56 3,51 2,09 2,15 2,45 
1973 - 1989 Silicon Chips 3,19 2,19 1,11 1,32 3,20 2,23 1,14 1,33 
1990 - 2013 Information  2,46 1,41 1,63 1,72 2,45 1,49 1,64 1,70 
Average 3,17 1,98 1,68 1,87 3,06 1,93 1,64 1,83 
 
JAP Industry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1950 - 1972 Computer 9,35 8,14 7,53 7,31 8,62 7,54 6,95 6,64 
1973 - 1989 Silicon Chips 3,91 3,07 2,87 3,31 3,82 3,00 2,93 3,41 
1990 - 2013 Information  1,13 0,99 1,01 1,71 1,05 0,92 0,96 1,69 
Average 4,80 4,06 3,80 4,11 4,50 3,82 3,61 3,91 
 
GER Industry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1950 - 1972 Computer 6,04 5,36 4,79 5,92 5,62 4,99 4,52 5,55 
1973 - 1989 Silicon Chips 2,16 2,18 1,97 3,03 2,04 2,09 1,91 2,93 
1990 - 2013 Information  1,53 1,37 1,08 1,67 1,58 1,41 1,07 1,70 
Average 3,24 2,97 2,61 3,54 3,08 2,83 2,50 3,40 
1 GDP growth, 2 GDPpc growth, 3 LP per person growth, 4 LP per hour growth, 5 GDP 
growth due to technological progress, 6 GDPpc growth due to technological progress, 7 LP 
per person growth due to technological progress, 8 LP per hour growth due to technological 
progress 
* average growth rates 
** possible slight differences in aggregation due to a rounding-up problem 
Source: Author's calculation. Systematization based on Falatoon and Safarzahed (2006). 
 
 
Table 2. Results of ARIMA models 
 
USA  
lnGDP ARIMA (1,1,2) 
             coefficient   std. error   t-ratio    p-value  
  --------------------------------------------------------- 
  const       0,0310011    0,00333871    9,285    1,61e-020 *** 
  phi_1      -0,799968     0,299147     -2,674    0,0075    *** 
  theta_1     0,969718     0,300267      3,230    0,0012    *** 
  theta_2     0,234266     0,137865      1,699    0,0893    * 
Mean dependent var   0,030946   S.D. dependent var   0,022351 
Mean of innovations -0,000043   S.D. of innovations  0,021708 
Log-likelihood       151,8360   Akaike criterion    -293,6719 
Schwarz criterion   -282,9563   Hannan-Quinn        -289,4574 
Test for ARCH of order 1 -  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(1) > 0,0133012) = 0,908183 
Test for normality of residual -  with p-value = 0,812486 
 
lnGDPpc ARIMA (2,1,1) 
             coefficient   std. error   t-ratio    p-value  
  --------------------------------------------------------- 
  const       0,0199494    0,00110639   18,03     1,11e-072 *** 
  phi_1       0,887680     0,0871895    10,18     2,41e-024 *** 
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  theta_1    -0,841838     0,137640     -6,116    9,58e-010 *** 
  theta_2    -0,158162     0,127676     -1,239    0,2154    
Mean dependent var   0,019291   S.D. dependent var   0,022116 
Mean of innovations  0,001259   S.D. of innovations  0,021240 
Log-likelihood       152,4964   Akaike criterion    -294,9929 
Schwarz criterion   -284,2772   Hannan-Quinn        -290,7784 
Test for normality of residual -  with p-value = 0,217295 
Test for ARCH of order 1 -  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(1) > 0,471082) = 0,49249 
 
lnLPperson ARIMA (1,1,1) 
             coefficient   std. error   t-ratio    p-value  
  --------------------------------------------------------- 
  const       0,0172063    0,00243942    7,053    1,75e-012 *** 
  phi_1       0,816590     0,215287      3,793    0,0001    *** 
  theta_1    -0,716790     0,248260     -2,887    0,0039    *** 
Mean dependent var   0,017085   S.D. dependent var   0,013170 
Mean of innovations -0,000206   S.D. of innovations  0,012881 
Log-likelihood       184,7527   Akaike criterion    -361,5054 
Schwarz criterion   -352,9328   Hannan-Quinn        -358,1337 
Test for ARCH of order 1 -  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(1) > 0,386182) = 0,534313 
Test for normality of residual -  with p-value = 0,329251 
 
lnLPhour ARIMA (1,1,1) 
             coefficient   std. error   t-ratio    p-value  
  --------------------------------------------------------- 
  const       0,0189272    0,00286726    6,601    4,08e-011 *** 
  phi_1       0,898841     0,100843      8,913    4,95e-019 *** 
  theta_1    -0,752320     0,132178     -5,692    1,26e-08  *** 
Mean dependent var   0,018857   S.D. dependent var   0,010674 
Mean of innovations -0,000380   S.D. of innovations  0,010106 
Log-likelihood       199,9536   Akaike criterion    -391,9071 
Schwarz criterion   -383,3346   Hannan-Quinn        -388,5355 
Test for normality of residual -  with p-value = 0,128183 




lnGDP ARIMA (1,1,1) 
             coefficient   std. error   t-ratio    p-value  
  --------------------------------------------------------- 
  const       0,0501978    0,0244337     2,054    0,0399    ** 
  phi_1       0,954164     0,0472648    20,19     1,26e-090 *** 
  theta_1    -0,547281     0,155980     -3,509    0,0005    *** 
Mean dependent var   0,045837   S.D. dependent var   0,040171 
Mean of innovations -0,002429   S.D. of innovations  0,024898 
Log-likelihood       142,6179   Akaike criterion    -277,2358 
Schwarz criterion   -268,6632   Hannan-Quinn        -273,8641 
Test for normality of residual -  with p-value = 0,00164531 
Test for ARCH of order 1 -  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(1) > 0,190018) = 0,662902 
 
lnGDPpc ARIMA (1,1,1) 
             coefficient   std. error   t-ratio    p-value  
  --------------------------------------------------------- 
  const       0,0426046    0,0189774     2,245    0,0248    ** 
  phi_1       0,935271     0,0606922    15,41     1,40e-053 *** 
  theta_1    -0,533612     0,167429     -3,187    0,0014    *** 
Mean dependent var   0,039207   S.D. dependent var   0,036888 
Mean of innovations -0,001901   S.D. of innovations  0,024814 
Log-likelihood       142,9607   Akaike criterion    -277,9213 
Schwarz criterion   -269,3488   Hannan-Quinn        -274,5497 
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Test for normality of residual -  with p-value = 0,00396876 
Test for ARCH of order 1 - with p-value = P(Chi-Square(1) > 0,264912) = 0,606765 
 
lnLPperson ARIMA (1,1,1) 
             coefficient   std. error   t-ratio    p-value  
  --------------------------------------------------------- 
  const       0,0392079    0,0171020     2,293    0,0219    ** 
  phi_1       0,934035     0,0582016    16,05     5,88e-058 *** 
  theta_1    -0,529493     0,162314     -3,262    0,0011    *** 
Mean dependent var   0,036809   S.D. dependent var   0,033765 
Mean of innovations -0,001685   S.D. of innovations  0,022553 
Log-likelihood       148,9845   Akaike criterion    -289,9690 
Schwarz criterion   -281,3965   Hannan-Quinn        -286,5974 
Test for normality of residual -  with p-value = 0,00913348 
Test for ARCH of order 1 -  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(1) > 0,254406) = 0,613989 
 
lnLPhour ARIMA (1,1,1) 
             coefficient   std. error   t-ratio    p-value  
  --------------------------------------------------------- 
  const       0,0429885    0,0149627     2,873    0,0041    *** 
  phi_1       0,893557     0,0745403    11,99     4,13e-033 *** 
  theta_1    -0,288445     0,160191     -1,801    0,0718    * 
Mean dependent var   0,039904   S.D. dependent var   0,030923 
Mean of innovations -0,001414   S.D. of innovations  0,019772 
Log-likelihood       157,2401   Akaike criterion    -306,4801 
Schwarz criterion   -297,9076   Hannan-Quinn        -303,1085 
Test for normality of residual -  with p-value = 0,013269 




lnGDP ARIMA (1,1,1) 
             coefficient   std. error   t-ratio    p-value  
  --------------------------------------------------------- 
  const       0,0412113    0,0246512     1,672    0,0946    * 
  phi_1       0,981020     0,0259469    37,81     0,0000    *** 
  theta_1    -0,739453     0,0873928    -8,461    2,65e-017 *** 
Mean dependent var   0,032023   S.D. dependent var   0,029703 
Mean of innovations -0,003953   S.D. of innovations  0,022339 
Log-likelihood       149,3537   Akaike criterion    -290,7075 
Schwarz criterion   -282,1349   Hannan-Quinn        -287,3359 
Test for normality of residual -  with p-value = 0,25527 
Test for ARCH of order 1 -  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(1) > 1,00041) = 0,317212 
 
lnGDPpc ARIMA (1,1,1) 
             coefficient   std. error   t-ratio    p-value  
  --------------------------------------------------------- 
  const       0,0382826    0,0217035     1,764    0,0778    * 
  phi_1       0,979730     0,0273508    35,82     5,23e-281 *** 
  theta_1    -0,757927     0,0837825    -9,046    1,48e-019 *** 
Mean dependent var   0,029253   S.D. dependent var   0,027855 
Mean of innovations -0,003805   S.D. of innovations  0,021946 
Log-likelihood       150,5353   Akaike criterion    -293,0706 
Schwarz criterion   -284,4981   Hannan-Quinn        -289,6990 
Test for normality of residual -  with p-value = 0,416945 
Test for ARCH of order 1 -  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(1) > 1,04107) = 0,307573 
 
lnLPperson ARIMA (1,1,1) 
             coefficient   std. error   t-ratio    p-value  
  --------------------------------------------------------- 
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  const       0,0292974    0,0201097     1,457    0,1451    
  phi_1       0,987377     0,0178799    55,22     0,0000    *** 
  theta_1    -0,743160     0,0804514    -9,237    2,53e-020 *** 
  Dummy      -0,0439401    0,00901468   -4,874    1,09e-06  *** 
Mean dependent var   0,025662   S.D. dependent var   0,022588 
Mean of innovations -0,002962   S.D. of innovations  0,014410 
Log-likelihood       176,7951   Akaike criterion    -343,5901 
Schwarz criterion   -332,8744   Hannan-Quinn        -339,3756 
Test for normality of residual  - with p-value = 0,0560599 
Test for ARCH of order 1 -  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(1) > 0,0021587) = 0,962942 
 
lnLPhour ARIMA (1,1,1) 
             coefficient   std. error   t-ratio    p-value  
  --------------------------------------------------------- 
  const       0,0376084    0,0230648     1,631    0,1030    
  phi_1       0,987078     0,0184424    53,52     0,0000    *** 
  theta_1    -0,674729     0,101086     -6,675    2,48e-011 *** 
Mean dependent var   0,034473   S.D. dependent var   0,022390 
Mean of innovations -0,002618   S.D. of innovations  0,013311 
Log-likelihood       181,6775   Akaike criterion    -355,3550 
Schwarz criterion   -346,7824   Hannan-Quinn        -351,9834 
Test for normality of residual -  with p-value = 0,247082 
Test for ARCH of order 1 -  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(1) > 0,376163) = 0,539664 




Table 3. Correlations between the countries by variables 
 
Correlation T%GDP_GER T%GDP_JAP T%GDP_USA 
T%GDP_GER 1 0.69 0.48 
T%GDP_JAP 0.69 1 0.41 
T%GDP_USA 0.48 0.41 1 
   
Correlation T%GDPpc_GER T%GDPpcJAP T%GDPpc_USA 
T%GDPpc_GER 1 0.65 0.41 
T%GDPpc_JAP 0.65 1 0.36 
T%GDPpc_USA 0.41 0.36 1 
 
 
Correlation T%LP-hour_GER T%LP-hour_JAP T%LP-hour_USA 
T%LP-hour_GER 1 0.64 0.35 
T%LP-hour_JAP 0.64 1 0.29 
T%LP-hour_USA 0.35 0.29 1 
 
 
Correlation T%LP-person_GER T%LP-person_JAP T%LP-person_USA 
T%LP-person_GER 1 0.55 0.40 
T%LP-person_JAP 0.55 1 0.27 
T%LP-person_USA 0.40 0.27 1 
Source: Author's calculation. 
 
  
